Fordham Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 4

1939

Obligatory Interstate Recognition of Divorce Decrees–A New
Trend?
Hamilton Vreeland, Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hamilton Vreeland, Jr., Obligatory Interstate Recognition of Divorce Decrees–A New Trend?, 8 Fordham L.
Rev. 80 (1939).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol8/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

COMMENTS
OBLIGATORY

INTERSTATE RECOGNITION

OF DIVORCE

DEcREES-A NEW

TREND?

The case of Davis v. Davis,' decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States on November 7, 1938, adds two important doctrines to the law
concerning the obligatory interstate recognition of divorce decrees and very
materially obviates the need of a uniform divorce recognition act. It holds that
a decree of divorce obtained in Virginia on the ground of desertion by a husband whose domicil was determined by the Virginia court to be in that Commonwealth, but which State was not the last matrimonial domicil of the couple,
is entitled to obligatory recognition against a wife domiciled in the District of
Columbia, where she was not served personally with the jurisdiction of the Virginia court but had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of that court by reason
of her special appearance and conduct.
The first of these doctrines is that a defendant even though not served
personally within the jurisdiction of the court and though merely appearing
specially for the sole purpose of contesting jurisdiction may by his or her con.
duct submit to the jurisdiction of the court for an adjudication on the merits.
These matters of conduct are revealed where the court said:
"The recital in the decree of reference, that the cause came on for hearing upon,
inter alia, argument of counsel, suggests that both parties were heard. The stipulation
of counsel that the commissioner should only ascertain the facts raised by her plea
shows action by both parties relating to merits, at least to the extent that it withdrew
the case from the commissioner. The record discloses no challenge by respondent
to the statement, in the decree overruling her exceptions, that the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. The gran of time within which to
answer implies application to that end. A motion for such an order relates to merits.
Hupfeld v. Automaton Piano Co., (C. C.) 66 F. 788, 789. The service of notice of
taking depositions upon respondent in the District of Columbia and upon her counsel
in Virginia implies that petitioner's counsel understood that respondent had standing
to appear and cross-examine. Plainly her plea and conduct in the Virginia court cannot be regarded as special appearance merely to challenge jurisdiction. Considered
in its entirety, the record shows that she submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
Virginia court and is bound by its determination that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, supra (188 U. S. 40, 47 L.
ed. 372, 23 S. Ct. 237)."2

Previous cases on this subject have used the expression "subject to the jurisdiction" of the court rendering the decree s but heretofore this has been construed
to mean that the defendant was personally served or had generally appeared
at the forum. In the Davis case appears the first application by the Supreme
Court to the field of divorce recognition of the doctrine which was applied
by the Supreme Court for the first time in any kind of case in Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Asso., 4 namely, that a special appearance plus conduct
1. 59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L. Ed. 52 (1938).
2. See id. at 7, 83 L. Ed., at 57.
3. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
4.

Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522, 525 et seq. (1931).
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such as occurred in the Davis case will constitute or be the equivalent of a
general appearance.
The minimum requirements of the Supreme Court for a decree of obligatory
interstate recognition of divorce decrees must therefore now be stated as follows: (1) where both parties were domiciled in the State rendering the decree
and there was notice to the defendant, regardless of personal service upon or
appearance by the defendant at the forum; 5 (2) where the court rendering
the decree had jurisdiction over the last matrimonial domidil of the couple and
the actual domicil of the husband when he sued for divorce against a deserting
wife, if there was notice to the defendant, hut regardless of personal service
upon or appearance by the defendant at the forum;0 and (3) where only the
plaintiff was domiciled at the forum if the defendant was served personally
within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree or appeared generally
there,7 or otherwise personally submitted to such jurisdiction through special
appearance and conduct.8
The second of these doctrines, which the Supreme Court specifically states
for the first time with regard to this subject, is that the finding of a court that
the plaintiff is a bona fide resident of the State within which that court is
situated is binding upon the defendant in the courts of the place where be or
she resides concerning both the facts of domidil and of fraud in its acquisition
where the defendant appeared specially in the court of instance, put in issue
the plaintiff's allegation as to domicil, alleged fraud in the acquisition thereof,
introduced evidence to show that the domicil was false, took exceptions to the
commission's report in that regard, and sought to have the court sustain them
and uphold her plea.P In view of the manner in which some State courts, in
which recognition of foreign decrees was sought, have treated the determination
of the presence of domicil and the absence of fraud by the court of instance,
the dear enunciation of this doctrine by the Supreme Court was badly needed
in the interest of social order. Presumably such a finding would also be binding upon the defendant where he or she had been personally served at the
forum or had appeared generally there but had not actively contested these
matters, under the rule that in such circumstances there is an estoppel by
judgment concerning any defense which might have been made.
HAZXITON VREELAND, Jiiuf
5.
6.
551,
7.
8.
9.
t

See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906) serabke.
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); see Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S.
562 (1913).
Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 103 (U. S. 1869).
Davis v. Davis, 59 Sup. Ct. 3. 83 L. Ed. 52 (1938).
See i4d. at 5, 83 L. Ed., at.6.
Member of New York Bar.
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Is the American Medical Association, or the subsidiary Medical Society of the
District of Columbia, violating the antitrust laws in their opposition to the Group
Health Association? It will be very helpful in discussing the matter, to briefly
outline the salient facts leading up to this problem.
On February 24, 1937, the Group Health Association, Inc., was granted a
charter1 in Washington as a so-called "Co-operative Health" corporation.
Through a staff of hired physicians it offered to render most types of medical
and surgical treatments 2 at a stated annual cost; 3 and offered such services
only to Federal employees and their families. The Medical Society of the
District of Columbia opposed this new scheme as contravening the best interests
both of the public, and of the physicians, and as violative of its own code
of ethics, as well as the Principles and Ethics of the American Medical Association which represents some 110,000 physicians 4 in this country.
The members of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia knew the
above facts; but several of them, nevertheless, became affiliated with that new
organization. One member 5 was finally expelled after charges were brought
against him in accordance with the rules and regulations of his society. Several
other physicians resigned from the Group Health Association rather than risk
society expulsion.
The newspapers8 took up the issues, pro and con, so that they gradually
became national in their scope; and the discussion finally invaded Congress
early in 1938. 7 Representative Scott s offered a resolution to investigate the
*This article is an analysis of the statement of the Department of Justice, released to
the press August 1, 1938, wherein it was contended that the American Medical Association
and its affiliate, the Medical Society of the District of Columbia, were attempting to

prevent the Group Health Association, of the District of Columbia, from functioning In
violation of the antitrust laws. The views expressed herein are the views of the author.
[Editorial Note.]
1. QuESTIoNs AND ANSWEs ABOUT GROUP HnAITH (1937) § 3, (pamphlet prepared
by Group Health Association, Inc.).
2. By-laws of the Group Health Association (Revised Oct. 25, 1937). Art. X, §§ 1, 4.
(1937) § 4.
To the same effect, see QuEsTONs AND ANswERs ABOUT GROUP HE.AL
3. The latest charges are as follows: (a) An application fee of $5 plus $1 for each
dependent. (b) A $10 membership fee, if admitted. (c) Monthly dues of single members
or head of family $2.20; husband or wife $1.80; child dependents under 18, $1; child
dependents 18-21 years (each) $1.00; adult dependents over 21 years (each) $2.20.
A man in a family of four people would therefore have to pay $78.00 during the first
year, and $60.00 per annum thereafter. Besides these charges there is a $25 maternity
charge; a $1.00 house charge for the first visit; there also is a fifty cent additional charge
per visit for treatment of venereal diseases. See QuEsnoNs AND ANSWERS ABOUT GIROUP
HmTH H§ 10-14. See also membership blank of Group Health Association.
4. (1938) 111 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 1194.
6. Washington Post, March 27, 1938, Magazine Section.
6. Ibid. Also newspapers throughout the country have had numerous discussions pro
and con during the past year.
7. Hon. Jed Johnson, 83 CoNo. REc., Feb. 16, 1938, at p. 2803.
8. Hon. Byron Scott, 83 CONG. Rzc., May 3, 1938, at p. 8101.

